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Abstract
The tenure arrangement of primary constitutional organ leaders is required 
as the implementation of power limitation principle and the manifestation of 
political equality principle as the characteristic of democratic state. The tenure 
arrangements of primary constitutional organ leaders in Indonesia have four 
models: tenure arrangement through the 1945 Constitution, tenure arrangement 
through Law, tenure arrangement which is not regulated by law but regulated 
in the constitutional organs’ internal regulation, and tenure arrangement which 
is not regulated by law as well as internal regulation. The problem in this paper 
is: First, how is the arrangement of leadership tenure in the constitutional 
organs according to the Indonesian legislation system. Second, how to adjust the 
arrangement of constitutional organ leader in order to provide legal certainty and 
prevent conflict that can disrupt organs’ performance. The arrangement through 
the Constitution is the most powerful model in term of legal certainty regarding 
that the Constitution is in the highest national legal order and materials related 
to the structure and organization of primary constitutional organs constitute the 
Constitution’s substance. The model not regulated in law but regulated in internal 
regulation prone to cause conflict because every member of the constitutional 
organs which meets the requirements may change the internal regulation at any 
time. To avoid this conflict, this paper concludes that it requires the change of 
regulation regulating the tenure of constitutional organ leaders so that it is no 
longer regulated in the constitutional organs’ internal regulations, but it is set 
in the 1945 Constitution or at least in the Law in order to have a better legal 
certainty.
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I. INTRODUCTION
1.1 Background
One of the constitutional organs in Indonesia, i.e. Regional Representatives 
Council (DPD), is engaged in internal conflict among its members since March 
2016. It is caused by different opinion on the ratification of DPD’s code of 
conduct especially the limitation of DPD leadership tenure from five years 
to two and a half years.1 The supporting party argues that the tenure of 
DPD leader is not explicitly mentioned in the Law No. 17/2014 on People’s 
Consultative Assembly (MPR), House of Representatives (DPR), Regional 
Representatives Council (DPD), and Provincial Legislative Council (DPRD). 
Therefore, it becomes the authority of DPD members to determine DPD’s 
code of conduct. Moreover, the limitation of leadership tenure from 5 years 
to 2.5 years is also required to evaluate leader’s performance and make him 
focus on managing the institution. If it is too long, a leader can become 
complacent about the position.2 
 On the contrary, the party which does not agree with the tenure 
limitation from 5 years to 2.5 years argues this change is not taken in 
accordance with the constitutional practice stipulated in the Law No. 17/2014. 
Then, the change of leadership tenure is false and unfounded regarding the 
election cycle and DPD membership period are applied mutatis mutandis 
towards the tenure of DPD leader, i.e. five years. It is also applied to the 
tenure of MPR leader, DPR leader, and DPRD leader.3
The conflict happens to DPD as a constitutional organ will have a certain 
implication to the effective implementation of its authorities and duties. 
Moreover, the internal conflict on the limitation of leadership tenure can 
1  The DPD was established based on the 3rd amendment of the 1945 Constitution in November 2001. It aims to fulfill the need of 
justice for society in regions, to expand and to increase the motivation and the capacity of regions in the national life as well as 
to strengthen the Unitary State of the Republic of Indonesia. See DPD RI, “Profil”, http://dpd.go.id/halaman-profil, accessed 10 
April 2016.
2  Kompas.com, “Anggota DPD: Polemik Pemangkasan Masa Jabatan Pimpinan Untuk Evaluasi Kinerja”, http://nasional.kompas.
com/read/2016/04/19/13072211/Anggota.DPD.Polemik.Pemangkasan.Masa.Jabatan.Pimpinan.untuk.Evaluasi.Kinerja?utm_
campaign=related&utm_medium=bp-kompas&utm_source=news&, accessed 19 April 2016.
3  Kompas.com. “Irman Gusman Anggap Pemangkasan Masa Jabatannya Bertentangan dengan UU”, http://nasional.kompas.com/
read/2016/03/17/22361671/Irman.Gusman.Anggap.Pemangkasan.Masa.Jabatannya.Bertentangan.dengan.UU?utm_source=RD&utm_
medium=inart&utm_campaign=khiprd, accessed 10 April 2016.
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also affect the dignity and public confidence in DPD. The public confidence 
is not quite high before the conflict. It is based on the survey findings 
conducted by the Indonesian Survey Circle (LSI) on 11-15 December 2015 
showing only 53.4%.4 
Internal conflict by the members of constitutional organs, including the 
leadership tenure, will greatly affect the performance and the goal achievement 
of constitutional organs. Jimly Asshiddiqie states that: 
Institutional structure consists of people who hold their own position 
and role with different attitude and behavior. If the togetherness at work 
environment creates a traditional work culture, then the work climate 
and work relationship among the members will be mixed between 
personal and official matters. The stronger is the paternalistic and 
feudalistic culture in institutional structure, the stronger is the conflict 
of interest in every position level. The conflict of interest between 
those two matters will disturb objectivity, rationality, and professional 
work culture. Then, it slows the growth of institutional performance to 
achieve a common goal.5
DPD’s conflict on leadership tenure happens because there is no single 
basic regulation to unite the regulation of constitutional organ leadership 
tenure in Indonesian constitutional system, especially primary constitutional 
organs (President and Vice President, MPR, DPR, DPD, MA, MK, and BPK). 
The absence of single basic regulation here means that there some regulations 
ruling the tenure of constitutional organ leaders qualified as primary 
constitutional organs. Those regulations range from the 1945 Constitution 
(UUD 1945), Law (UU), constitutional organs’ internal regulation, or even 
not regulated at all.
The diversity of regulations will have some consequences as experienced 
by DPD. It results from the incomplete process to regulate its leadership 
tenure. Logemann as cited by Sri Soemantri states that the mechanism of 
constitutional organ leader appointment, including the leadership tenure is an 
issue which needs certainty. Logemann suggests several issues in constitutional 
4 Kompas.com, “Survei LSI: Kepercayaan Publik terhadap DPR Ada di Titik Terendah”, http://nasional.kompas.com/
read/2015/12/17/14485741/Survei.LSI.Kepercayaan.Publik.Terhadap.DPR.Paling.Rendah, accessed 11 April 2016.
5 Jimly Asshiddiqie, “Liberalisasi Sistem Pengisian Jabatan Publik”, a paper presented at 2nd Konferensi Hukum Tata Negara, Universitas 
Andalas, September 2015, p. 4.
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organs, as follows: (1) The creation of constitutional organs. It means who 
creates and arranges the organs. (2) Because every constitutional organ is 
led by a leader, the problem is how is the mechanism. It can be conducted 
by election, appointment, or other mechanisms. (3) What are their duties 
and authorities. To achieve the country’s goal, every constitutional organ 
should be given duties and authorities. (4) How is the relationship between 
the constitutional organs.6 
The leadership tenure and constitutional organ require certain 
arrangements to prevent absolutism. Christopher Pierson states that:
Absolutism signaled the emergence of a form of state based upon: the 
absorption of smaller and weaker political units into larger and stronger 
political structures; a strengthened ability to rule over a unified territorial 
area; a tightened system of law and order enforced throughout a territory; 
the application of a ‘more unitary, continuous, calculable and effective’ 
rule by a single, sovereign head; and the development of a relatively 
small number of states engaged in an open-ended, competitive, and 
risk-laden power struggle.7
1.2 Questions
This paper will raise the issue related to the tenure of constitutional 
organ leader in the Indonesian constitutional system. First, how is the 
arrangement of leadership tenure in the constitutional organs according to 
the Indonesian legislation system. Then, how to adjust the arrangement of 
constitutional organ leader in order to provide legal certainty and prevent 
conflict that can disrupt organs’ performance.
II. DISCUSSION
2.1 The arrangement of leadership tenure in primary constitutional organ 
according to the Indonesian legislation system.
The arrangement of constitutional organ leadership tenure is based on at 
least two considerations. The first consideration is the implementation of power 
6  Konsorsium Reformasi Hukum Nasional (KRHN) and Mahkamah Konstitusi RI, Lembaga Negara dan Sengketa Kewenangan Antar 
Lembaga Negara, Jakarta: KRHN, 2005,  p. 15. 
7  Christoper Pierson, Modern State, Second Edition, New York: Routledge, 2004, p. 35.
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limitation principle; and secondly, the manifestation of political equality principle 
among citizens as the characteristic of democratic state.
First, as the implementation of power limitation principle. The implementation 
of law-state principle adopted by Indonesia as stipulated in Article 1 (3) of the 
1945 Constitution is power limitation.8 According to the history of the birth of 
Article 1 (3) of the 1945 Constitution, it can be seen that Indonesia is a law-state 
which maintains the supremacy of law to uphold truth and justice, and there is 
no unaccountable power.9
According to legal experts’ opinion, there are some characteristics of Indonesia 
as the law-state. Jimly Asshiddiqie suggests thirteen basic principles of law-state 
(Rechtsstaat), one of them is power limitation.10 The power limitation is necessary 
because according to “the iron law” every power has a tendency to be arbitrary. It 
is in line with Lord Acton’s opinion: “Power tends to corrupt, and absolute power 
corrupts absolutely”.11 Therefore, power must be limited by separating them into 
some branches which function as ‘checks and balances’. Those branches balance 
and control each other as well as have an equal position.12 The power limitation 
is also conducted by distributing the power into some organs arranged vertically. 
Therefore, the power is not centralized and concentrated in one single organ 
allowing the arbitrariness.13
The limitation of tenure can be seen as part of the power limitation from 
some point of views. Moreover, the limitation of state organs’ authority as the 
main function of constitution is basically related to two different aspects of 
power, i.e. (a) scope of power; and (b) period of power. The limitation of the 
scope of power can be carried out by (a) separation of power; and (b) division 
of power. The limitation of the period of power can be done by establishing the 
tenure of state officials.14 
8  Article 1(3) of the 1945 Constitution, “The state of Indonesia is a state based on law”.
9  Sekretariat Jenderal MPR RI, Panduan Pemasyarakatan Undang-Undang Dasar Negara Republik Indonesia Tahun 1945 dan Ketetapan 
Majelis Permusyawaratan  Rakyat Republik Indonesia, Jakarta: Sekjend MPR, 2012, p. 68.
10 Jimly Asshiddiqie, “Gagasan Negara Hukum Indonesia”, a paper presented at Forum Dialog Perencanaan Pembangunan Nasi-
onal, Badan Pembinaan Hukum Nasional (BPHN), Ministry of Law and Human Rights of Indonesia, 22-24 November 2011, p. 6.
11 Ibid.
12 Ibid.
13 Ibid.
14 Hotma P Sibuea, “Pemberhentian Presiden/Wakil Presiden Pada Masa Jabatan Oleh Majelis Permusyawaratan Rakyat Dalam 
Sistem Ketatanegaaan Indonesia”, Jurnal Hukum Staatrechts, Volume 1, Issue 1, October 2014, p. 88.
The Tenure Arrangement of Primary Constitutional Organ Leaders 
in Indonesian Constitutional System
Constitutional Review, May 2016, Volume 2, Number 134
Tenure limitation is also adopted by the 22nd amendment of United States 
Constitution stating: 
No person shall be elected to the office of the President more than twice, and 
no person who has held the office of President, or acted as President, for more 
than two years of a term to which some other person was elected President 
shall be elected to the office of the President more than once. But this article 
shall not apply to any person holding the office of President when this article 
was proposed by the Congress, and shall not prevent any person who may be 
holding the office of President, or acting as President, during the term within 
which this article becomes operative from holding the office of President or 
acting as President during the remainder of such term. 
The limitation of USA Presidential tenure for only two periods according 
to Stephen W Statis is “to strengthen and safeguard democracy from what they 
believed to be its greatest danger: the aggran-dizement, consolidation, and even 
usurpation of political power by the executive branch of government”.15
Power needs to be limited because it will reduce the power devoted to certain 
interests which is inappropriate to the objective of the power itself. Alexander 
Tabbarok explains that:
Since political exchange is rarely simultaneous or subject to enforce-able 
contracts there is potential for opportunism. Will the representative exert 
high effort for the interest? Will the interest fulfill its promises of support? 
Answering these questions in the affirmative requires that there be mutual 
trust between interest and representative, which can only be created in a 
long-term relationship.16
Second, as a manifestation of political equality principle among citizens 
as the characteristic of democratic state. According to Article 1(2) of the 1945 
Constitution, Indonesia has declared itself as a democratic state. Then, Article 
1(2) of the 1945 Constitution states, “Sovereignty is vested in the people and 
implemented pursuant to the Constitution”. Miriam Budiardjo explains the 
compulsory elements must be possessed by the democratic state as follows: 
(1) constitutional protection, (2) independent and impartial judiciary, (3) free 
15  Stephen W Statis, The Twenty-Second Amendment: A Practical Remedy or Partisan Maneuver?, Constitutional Commentary, vol 
7:61, p. 69.
16  Alexander Tabbarok, “A survey,Critique, And New Defense Of Term Limits”, Ceto Journal, Vol. 14, Issue 2, FaIl 1994, p. 337.
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election, (4) freedom of expression, (5) freedom of association, organization, or 
opposition, and (6) civic education.17
Furthermore, the elements of democratic state can be achieved if these 
conditions are available: (1) a responsible government, (2) house of representatives 
elected from the election conduct a free supervision, (3) the presence of several 
political parties, (4) the presence of independent press or media, and (5) a free 
judicial system which guarantees human rights.18 Democratic state can also be 
achieved if every person has the same opportunity. James S. Fishkin states three 
democratic values, i.e. deliberation, political equality, and participation.19
Rainer Forst defines that deliberative value is not an individual and communal 
will as the source of legitimacy, but the source of legitimacy is the process of 
deliberative formation, argumentative discussion, a political decision which is 
reviewed together and it is temporary and open for revision20. According to 
James S. Fishkin, there are five conditions to obtain a quality deliberative value, 
as follows:
a. Information: The extent to which participants are given access to 
reasonably accurate information that they believe to be relevant to the 
issue. 
b. Substantive balance: The extent to which arguments offered by one side 
or from one perspective are answered by considerations offered by those 
who hold other perspectives.
c. Diversity: The extent to which the major positions in the public are 
represented by participants in the discussion.
d. Conscientiousness: The extent to which participants sincerely weigh the 
merits of the arguments.
e. Equal consideration: The extent to which arguments offered by all 
participants are considered on the merits regardless of which participants 
offer them.21
17 Miriam Budiarjo in Moh. Mahfud MD, Demokrasi dan Konstitusi di Indonesia: Studi tentang Interaksi Politik dan Kehidupan Ket-
atanegaraan, Jakarta: Rineka Cipta, 2000, p. 2.
18 Franz Magnis-Suseno, Mencari Sosok Demokrasi: Sebuah telaah filosofis, Jakarta: Gramedia Pustaka Utama, 1995, p. 56.
19 James S. Fishkin, When the People Speak Deliberative Democracy and Public Consultation, Oxford: Oxford University Press, p. 33.
20 Rainer Forst as quoted by F Budi Hardiman, Demokrasi Deliberatif, Menimbang ‘Negara Hukum’ dan ‘Ruang Publik’ dalam teori 
Diskursus Jurgen Habermas, Jakarta: Kanisius, 2009, p. 130.
21 James S. Fishkin, op.cit, p. 34.
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Moreover, the goal of democratic deliberation can be achieved by combining 
it with political equality, an idea in which everyone has an equal opportunity in 
every political choice. According to James S. Fishkin, the basic idea of  political 
equality is every citizen has an equal possibility to support any alternative 
(candidate, party, or policy). Therefore, democratic system should give every 
citizen an equal probability to be voters determining the ones who will serve 
in important position.22
The recognition of political equality principle in democratic living has 
been acknowledged in Indonesian constitution, i.e. Article 28D(3) of the 1945 
Constitution. It states, “Every citizen has the right to equal opportunity in 
government”. The provision of Article 28D(3) of the 1945 Constitution regulates the 
important materials in modern constitutional life with the following characteristics: 
First, good governance. Second, the rule of law. Third, Democracy. Fourth, 
checks-and-balances principle. Fifth, upholding human rights.23 Furthermore, 
the presence of citizens’ political rights provision in the 1945 Constitution will 
enhance the constitutional guarantee towards Indonesia’s human rights and make 
Indonesia as a more civilized country in the international arena.24
The presence of Article 28D (3) of the 1945 Constitution has become the 
foundation for  the Constitutional Court of Indonesia to provide constitutional 
protection for citizens, as reflected in the Constitutional Court Decision No. 5/
PUU-V/2007 reviewing Law No. 32/2004 on Regional Government (Regional 
Government Law) against the 1945 Constitution. In this case, the plaintiff argues 
that the nomination of regional head and deputy head which is monopolized by 
the political parties and does not give the opportunity for independent candidates 
to run for regional head and deputy head violates the 1945 Constitution. Then, 
the plaintiff also states that Article 28D (3) of the 1945 Constitution guarantees 
every citizen has the right to get an equal opportunity in government.25
22  Ibid, p. 43
23  Mahkamah Konstitusi RI, Naskah Komprehensif Perubahan Undang-Undang Dasar Negara Republik Indonesia Tahun 1945 Latar 
Belakang, Proses, dan Hasil Pembahasan 1999-2002, Book VIII concerning Warga Negara dan Penduduk, Hak Asasi Manusia, dan 
Agama, Jakarta: Sekretariat Jenderal MKRI, 2010, p. 219.
24  Ibid.
25  Constitutional Court Decision No. 5/PUU-V/2007 reviewing Law No. 32 of 2004 concerning Regional Government, p. 52.
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The Constitutional Court responds to this appeal that to provide the equality 
of rights for all citizens as guaranteed by Article 28D(1) and (3) of the 1945 
Constitution cannot be done by stating that the nomination of independent 
candidates as stipulated by Article 67(2) of the Law No. 11/2006 on Aceh 
Government violates the 1945 Constitution and therefore should be declared null 
and void, since the fact that the nomination of independent candidates does not 
violate the 1945 Constitution.26 However, the equality of rights can be conducted 
by requiring the Regional Government Law adapts to new developments made 
by the law maker to give the right for every individual to run for regional head 
and deputy head as independent candidate as stipulated in Article 67 (2) of the 
Aceh Government Law.27
After knowing the importance of the arrangement of constitutional organ 
leadership tenure, this article will discuss the form of leadership tenure 
arrangement especially for constitutional organs categorized as primary 
constitutional organs. According to Asshiddiqie, there are more than 34 
constitutional organs stated either directly or indirectly in the 1945 Constitution. 
Those 34 organs can be distinguished from two aspects, i.e. functionality and 
hierarchy.28 In term of the hierarchy, all 34 organs can be differentiated into 
three layers. The first layer is primary constitutional organs. The second layer is 
constitutional organs, while the third layer is regional organs.29
Asshiddiqie explains after the amendment of the 1945 Constitution there 
is no terminology of primary constitutional organs. However, to facilitate the 
understanding, constitutional organs in the first layer are referred to primary 
constitutional organs, namely: (i) President and Vice President; (ii) DPR 
(House of Representatives); (iii) DPD (Regional Representatives Council); (iv) 
MPR (People’s Consultative Assembly); (v) MK (Constitutional Court); (vi) MA 
(Supreme Court); and (vii) BPK (Supreme Audit Agency).30
26  Ibid, p. 55.
27  Ibid.
28  Jimly Asshiddiqie, Perkembangan dan Konsolidasi Lembaga Negara Pasca Reformasi, Jakarta: Sekretariat Jenderal dan Kepaniteraan 
MKRI, 2006, p. 105.
29  Ibid.
30  Ibid.
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Besides the hierarchy, they can be seen from their importance of position 
and function. The constitutional organs categorized as primary or principal 
are: (i) President; (ii) DPR (House of Representatives); (iii) DPD (Regional 
Representatives Council); (iv) MPR (People’s Consultative Assembly); (v) MK 
(Constitutional Court); (vi) MA (Supreme Court); and (vii) BPK (Supreme 
Audit Agency.31 Those organs are primary constitutional organs. Meanwhile, the 
other constitutional organs are supporting or auxiliary organs. Thus, the organs 
categorized as primary constitutional organs reflect countries’ major power 
branches, i.e. legislature, executive, and judiciary.32
In connection to the arrangement of constitutional organ leadership tenure 
categorized as primary constitutional organ, there are four legislation models 
which govern it. The first model is the arrangement of tenure through the 
1945 Constitution. The arrangement of the President and Vice President’s tenure 
belongs to this category as stipulated in Article 7 of the 1945 Constitution, “The 
President and Vice President hold office for a term of five years and can afterwards 
be elected to the same office, for one other term only”. 
Prior to the amendment of Article 7 of the 1945 Constitution, the original 
text is, “The President and Vice President hold office for a term of five years 
and can afterwards be elected again”. The amendment of Article 7 is motivated 
by the Indonesian constitutional practice in which there is no presidential 
turnover for decades.33 It is caused by the formulation of Article 7 of the 1945 
Constitution before the amendment which can bring several interpretations. It 
can be interpreted the president can be served many times or the president can 
only be served twice.34
Learning from the constitutional experience above, the amendment of Article 
7 is carried out by defining and limiting the tenure period of President and Vice 
President. They can be re-elected only for one more term. Therefore, President 
or Vice President may serve only a maximum of two terms.35
31  Ibid, p. 115.
32  Ibid, p. 116.
33  Sekretariat Jenderal MPR RI, Panduan Pemasyarakatan , op.cit, p. 86.
34  Ibid.
35  Ibid, p. 87.
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Syamsuddin explains that the limitation of President’s tenure through 
the amendment of Article 7 of the 1945 Constitution is needed because many 
developed, developing, or underdeveloped countries also limit their head of 
state or head of government’s term of office for only two periods. The other 
consideration is the most appropriate leadership tenure for the head of state or 
head of government is two periods.36
Regardless of democracy, constitution, and other noble values, people basically 
have natural limitations especially if they hold powerful position. These natural 
limitations can be a prison lulling the sovereign, so the vested interest appears 
and leads to the abuse of power.37
The second model is the arrangement of tenure through legislation. The 
constitutional organs belong to the second category are the Supreme Court and 
the Constitutional Court. The Supreme Court as one of the judicial authorities 
shall have the competence to make judgment at the cassation level, to review 
regulations made under a law against that law, as well as other competences as 
provided by law.38 The Supreme Court consists of chief justices, judges, registrars, 
and secretaries. The chief justices of the Supreme Court consist of one chief 
justice, two deputy chief justices, and some junior-chief justices. MA deputy 
chief justices consist of the deputy chief justice of judicial affairs and the deputy 
chief justice of non-judicial affairs.
MA Chief Justice and Deputy Chief Justice are elected from and by the 
supreme court justices and appointed by the President pursuant to Article 5(6) of 
the Law No. 5/2004 on the Amendment of the Law No 14/1985 on the Supreme 
Court holds office for a term of 5 (five) years. Although the tenure period of 
Chief Justice and Deputy Chief Justice has been determined, there is a note to 
this arrangement. The Law No. 14/1985 as amended by the Law No. 5/2004 and 
the Law No. 3/2009 did not regulate the limitation of how many times supreme 
court justice can serve as MA Chief Justice and Deputy Chief Justice.
36  Syamsuddin Haris, “Soal Pembatasan Kekuasaan Presiden”, Kolom Tempo, 3 September 1997, http://tempo.co.id/ang/min/02/27/
kolom4.htm, accessed 30 April 2016.
37  Ibid.
38  Article 24A(1) of the 1945 Constitution.
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The implication of the absence of limitation on how many times the ones can 
be MA Chief Justice and Deputy Chief Justice results in various interpretations 
whether supreme court justice can only serve as MA Chief Justice once or can 
serve as MA Chief Justice for many times. In other words, Article 5(6) of the 
Law No. 5/2004 has caused uncertainty. It undoubtedly violates Article 28D (1) 
of the 1945 Constitution which states, “Each person has the right to recognition, 
security, protection and certainty under the law that shall be just and treat 
everybody as equal before the law”.
The provisions of Article 5(6) of the Law No. 5/2004 does not meet four 
things related to legal certainty as stated by Achmad Ali, namely: First, law is 
positive which means it is legislation (Gesetzliches Recht). Second, law is based 
on facts such as “goodwill”, “decency”. Third, the fact should be formulated in a 
clear way so as to avoid mistakes in the meaning and easier to be implemented. 
Fourth, the positive law can be changed many times.39
The provisions of Article 5(6) of the Law No. 5/2004 is not formulated clearly 
so it brings confusion in the meaning and it is also difficult to be implemented. 
The unclear arrangement stated in Article 5(6) of the Law No. 5/2004 has 
enormous potential to cause problems in its application because legal certainty 
demands a clear law.
In addition to the Supreme Court, Article 24(2) of the 1945 Constitution 
determines the other judicial authority, i.e. the Constitutional Court. The 
Constitutional Court shall have the authority to make final decisions in cases of 
first and last instance handling the review of laws against the Constitution, to 
decide on authority arguments among constitutional organs whose competence 
is enshrined in the Constitution, to decide on the dissolution of political 
parties, and to decide on disputes regarding general election results.40 Moreover, 
the Constitutional Court also has the duty to rule on an opinion of the DPR 
regarding alleged violations by the President or the Vice President according to 
the Constitution.41 
39  Ahmad Ali, Menguak Teori Hukum (Legal Theory) dan Teori Peradilan (Judical Prudence, Jakarta: Kencana Prenada Media Group, 
2009, pp. 292-293.
40  Article 24C(1) of the 1945 Constitution.
41  Article 24C(2) of the 1945 Constitution.
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The Constitutional Court shall consist of Chief Justice and member, Deputy 
Chief Justice and member, as well as seven members of the constitutional 
justices. In connection to the election procedure and the tenure period of MK 
Chief Justice and Deputy Chief Justice, it is stipulated in Article 4(3) of the Law 
No. 8/2011 on the Amendment of the Law No. 24/2003 on the Constitutional 
Court. It states that MK Chief Justice and Deputy Chief Justice elected from 
and by constitutional justice members for a term of two years and six months 
from the date of appointment as MK Chief Justice and Deputy Chief Justice. 
Furthermore, Article 3A of the Law No. 8/2011 also regulates the elected MK 
Chief Justice and Deputy Chief Justice can afterwards be elected to the same 
office, for one other term only.
The tenure period of MK Chief Justice and Deputy Chief Justice in the 
Law 8/2011 is different from the Law 24/2003 which previously states MK Chief 
Justice and Deputy Chief Justice elected from and by constitutional justices for 
three years. According to the framers of the amendment of Law No 24/2003, the 
change of the tenure of MK Chief Justice and Deputy Chief Justice which is six-
months lower than the previous tenure is to adapt to the tenure of constitutional 
justices which is five years, i.e. the tenure of MK Chief Justice and Deputy Chief 
Justice is only 2.5 years, but they can be re-elected. This is a correction to the 
discrepancy between the tenure of constitutional justices for a term of five years 
and the tenure of MK Chief Justice and Deputy Chief Justice for a term of three 
years. If the Chief Justice and Deputy Chief Justice are re-elected for the second 
times, it will pass their tenure as constitutional justices which is only five years.42
The change of the tenure to 2.5 years is also carried out in order to provide 
opportunity and evaluation for constitutional justices in selecting Chief Justice 
and Deputy Chief Justice. The good or bad performance of Chief Justice and 
Deputy Chief Justice can be seen after 2.5 years. The change of the tenure of 
Chief Justice and Deputy Chief Justice to 2.5 years is an agreement among DPR 
factions after a tough debate related to this matter because some DPR factions 
42  Hukumonline, “Masa Jabatan Ketua MK Dipersingkat, Masa jabatan Ketua dan Wakil Ketua MK ditetapkan selama 2,5 tahun 
sebagai bahan evaluasi, http://www.hukumonline.com/berita/baca/lt4df8706b5baae/dpr-pangkas-masa-jabatan-ketua-mk, accessed 
10 April 2016.
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have their own opinions. The majority wanted a term of 2.5 years. Meanwhile, 
Golkar Party wanted a term of 5 years and Demokrat Party wanted the tenure 
is internally regulated by the Constitutional Court and did not need to be 
stipulated by the Constitutional Court Law.43
The third model is the tenure arrangement which is not regulated by law, 
but it is regulated internally (code of conduct). People’s Consultative Assembly 
(MPR), House of Representatives (DPR), and Regional Representatives Council 
(DPD) belong to this category. MPR has authority, including to amend and to 
ordain the Constitution, to inaugurate the President and/or Vice President, to 
decide on the DPR’s proposal to dismiss the President and/or Vice President 
during their term of office in the event that the Constitutional Court resolves 
that the President and/or Vice President is proven guilty of violating the law, to 
inaugurate the Vice President as the President if during his term the President 
passes away, resigns, is impeached, or is unable to carry out his duties, to select  a 
Vice President among two candidates nominated by the President if the position 
of the Vice President falls vacant.44
Article 15(1) of the Law No. 17/2014 states MPR leaders consist of one Chairman 
and four Vice Chairmen elected from and by the members of MPR. Then, the 
Article 15 (2) of the Law No. 17/2014 regulates MPR leaders are elected from and 
by the members of MPR in a “package”.
The Law No. 17/2014 does not regulate the tenure of MPR leader. Moreover, 
there is no provision of the Law No. 17/2014 delegates where will the arrangement 
of MPR leadership tenure be arranged. The only provision of the Law No. 17/2014 
which delegates the arrangement of MPR leaders is Article 15(10) stating the 
further provision for the election procedures of MPR leaders are stipulated in 
MPR’s Code of Conduct.
For the absence of tenure arrangement in the Law No. 17/2014, Article 24 
of the MPR Regulation No. 1/2014 on Code of Conduct regulates the tenure of 
MPR leaders are equal to the tenure of MPR members, as referred to in Article 
43  Ibid.
44  Article 3(1) and (2), Article 7B (6), Article 8(2) of the 1945 Constitution.
The Tenure Arrangement of Primary Constitutional Organ Leaders 
in Indonesian Constitutional System
Constitutional Review, May 2016, Volume 2, Number 1 43
8(2). The Article 8(2) of MPR Regulation No. 1/2014 regulates the tenure of MPR 
members is five years and ends when the new MPR members take an oath/
pledge. Therefore, according to MPR Regulation No. 1/2014 the MPR leadership 
tenure is five years.
The House of Representatives (DPR) has the power to enact laws together 
with the President, to approve or not to approve the government regulations in 
lieu of law submitted by the President to be endorsed into law, to jointly discuss 
with the President by taking into account the recommendations from the DPD 
and to approve the bill on the state budget submitted by the President, to give the 
President approval to declare war and make peace with other countries.45 Article 
84 (1) of the Law No. 17/2014 regulates DPR leaders consist of one Chairman 
and four Vice-Chairmen elected from and by DPR members. Then, Article 84 
(2) of the Law No. 17/2014 stipulates DPR leaders referred to in paragraph (1) is 
elected from and by DPR members in a “package”.
The Law No. 17/2014 does not regulate the tenure of DPR leader. Moreover, 
there is no provision of the Law No. 17/2014 delegates where will the arrangement 
of DPR leadership tenure be arranged. The only provision of the Law No. 17/2014 
which delegates the arrangement of DPR leaders is Article 84(10) of the Law No. 
17/2014 stating the further provision for the election procedures of DPR leaders 
are stipulated in DPR’s Code of Conduct.
For the absence of tenure arrangement in the Law No. 17/2014, Article 27(4) 
of the DPR Regulation No. 1/2014 on Code of Conduct regulates the tenure of 
DPR leaders are equal to the tenure of MPR members. Then, Article 76(4) of the 
Law No. 17/2014 and Article 8(4) of the DPR Regulation No. 1/2014 determine 
the tenure of DPR members is five years and ends when the new DPR members 
take an oath/pledge. Therefore, according to DPR Regulation No. 1/2014 the DPR 
leadership tenure is five years.
The Regional Representatives Council (DPD) has the authority to submit 
to the DPR bills dealing with regional autonomy, relations between the center 
and the regions, the establishment and growth as well as the merger of regions, 
45  See Article 11(1), Article 20 (1) and (2), Article 22(2), Article 23(2) of the 1945 Constitution.
The Tenure Arrangement of Primary Constitutional Organ Leaders 
in Indonesian Constitutional System
Constitutional Review, May 2016, Volume 2, Number 144
the management of natural and other economic resources,  and matters related 
to the financial balance between the center and the regions, to supervise the 
implementation of laws regarding: regional autonomy, the establishment, 
growth and merger of regions, relations between the center and the regions, 
the management of natural and other economic resources, the implementation 
of the state budget, taxation, education, and religion as well as to submit the 
results of its supervision to the DPR.46 Article 260 (1) of the Law No. 17/2014 
regulates DPD leaders consists of one Chairman and two Vice-Chairmen elected 
from and by DPD members in a DPD plenary session.
The Law No. 17/2014 does not regulate the tenure of DPD leader. Moreover, 
there is no provision of the Law No. 17/2014 delegates where will the arrangement 
of DPD leadership tenure be arranged. The only provision of the Law No. 17/2014 
which delegates the arrangement of DPD leaders is Article 260(7) stating the 
further provision for the election procedures of DPD leaders are stipulated in 
DPD’s Code of Conduct.
For the absence of tenure arrangement in the Law No. 17/2014, Article 66 
of the DPD Regulation No. 1/2014 on Code of Conduct regulates the tenure of 
DPD leaders are equal to the tenure of DPD members as referred to in Article 
7(4). Then, Article 7(4) of the DPD Regulation No. 1/2014 determines the tenure 
of DPD members is 5 (five) years and ends when the new DPD members take 
an oath/pledge. Therefore, according to DPD Regulation No. 1/2014 the DPD 
leadership tenure is five years.
The Fourth Model is the tenure arrangement is not regulated by law and 
internal regulation. Supreme Audit Agency (BPK) is categorized to the fourth 
model. BPK has the authority to audit the management and accountability of 
the state’s finances conducted by the Central Government, Regional Government, 
other Constitutional Organs, Bank Indonesia, State-Owned Enterprise, Public 
Service Agency, Region-Owned Enterprise, and other institutions or entities 
managing the state’s finances.47
46  Article 22D(1), (2), and (3) of the 1945 Constitution.
47  Article 23E(1) of the 1945 Constitution and Article 6(1) of Law No. 15 of 2006 on the Supreme Audit Agency.
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Article 15(1) of the Law No. 15/2006 on BPK regulates that BPK leaders 
consist of one chairman and one vice chairman. The election procedures of BPK 
leaders are stipulated in Article 15(2) of the Law No. 15/2006 which regulates 
BPK Chairman and Vice Chairman are elected from and by BPK members in 
the BPK membership session not longer than one month after the date of BPK 
membership inauguration by the President.
The Law No. 15/2006 does not regulate the tenure of BPK leader. Moreover, 
there is no provision of the Law No. 15/2006 delegates where will the arrangement 
of BPK leadership tenure be arranged. The only provision of the Law No. 15/2006 
which delegates the arrangement of BPK leaders is Article 15(5) stating the further 
provision for the election procedures of BPK Chairman and Vice-Chairman are 
stipulated in BPK Regulation.
BPK Regulation which implements Article 15(5) of the Law No. 15/2006 is the 
BPK Regulation No. 1/ 2009 on The Election Procedures of BPK Chairman and 
Vice Chairman. Based on the analysis of nineteen Articles in the BPK Regulation 
No. 1/2009, there is no provision regulating the tenure of BPK leaders. Article 
18 of the BPK Regulation No. 1/2009 only states that BPK Chairman and Vice 
Chairman take oath or pledge according to their religion guided by MA Chief 
Justice soon after appointed as BPK Chairman and Vice Chairman. The absence 
of this arrangement causes problem related to when the tenure of BPK leaders 
will be over, although in practice the tenure of BPK Chairman and Vice Chairman 
is five years equals to the tenure of BPK members.
2.2 The arrangement of leadership tenure in primary constitutional organ 
that provides legal certainty.
Based on the four models of tenure arrangement in primary constitutional 
organs, i.e. regulated by the 1945 Constitution, regulated by law, not regulated by 
law but regulated in the internal regulation, and not regulated by law and also 
not regulated by internal regulation, it can be analyzed the degree of strength 
related to legal certainty. The first model, regulated through the Constitution, 
is the most ideal model and gives the strongest tenure certainty. Then, it is 
followed by the second model, i.e. regulated by law.
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The model of leadership tenure arrangement in primary constitutional 
organs stated in the Constitution is the most powerful model in term of legal 
certainty for several reasons.  First, Constitution as the state constitution is the 
highest legal order according to Hans Kelsen.48 Constitution is considered to be 
a “constituent act”, and it is not an ordinary legislative act.49
Constitution is a higher law or even the highest and most fundamental law, 
because constitution is the source of legitimacy or the authorization for other 
legal forms or legislation.50 The consequence of constitution as the highest 
hierarchy of legislation is in accordance with the universal legal principle. Thus, 
legislation under the constitution must not conflict with the higher law in order 
to be valid and enforced.51
The recognition of constitution as the highest hierarchy of legislation is 
formally stipulated in the Law No 12/2011 on the Creation of Legislation. Article 
7(1) of the Law No. 12/2011 sets the type and hierarchy of legislation as follows: 
1945 Constitution; MPR Decree; Law/Government Regulations in Lieu of Law; 
Government Regulation, Presidential Regulation; Provincial Regulation; and 
Regency/City Regulation. Then, Article 7(2) of the Law No. 12/2011 states that 
the legal force of legislation is in accordance with the hierarchy.
Second, the tenure arrangement of primary constitutional organ leaders 
strongly associated with the structure and organization of primary constitutional 
organ constitutes the Constitution’s substance. According to Sri Soemantri, various 
constitutions in the world generally include three substance groups, i.e.: (1) The 
presence of human rights and citizens protection regulation; (2) The presence 
of fundamental constitutional structure regulation; and; (3) The presence of the 
limitation and division of fundamental constitutional duties.52
Moreover, Merriam Budiardjo describes every constitution consists of some 
provisions as follows: (1) State Organization, e.g. division of power between the 
legislature, executive, and judiciary branches; division of power between federal 
48  Hans Kelsen, General Theory Of Law and State, translated By Anders Wedberg, New York: Russel & Russel, 1973, p. 156.
49  Jimly Asshiddiqie, Konstitusi & Konstitusionalisme Indonesia, Jakarta: Konstitusi Press, 2005, p. 18.
50  Ibid, p. 19.
51  Ibid.
52  Sri Soemantri, Undang-Undang Dasar 1945 Kedudukan dan Aspek-Aspek Perubahannya, Bandung: Unpad Press, 2002, p. 3.
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government and state government; problem solving procedure of jurisdiction 
violation by government agencies and so on, (2) Human Rights, (3) Procedure 
of Constitution Amendment, and (4) Some of them include prohibition to 
change certain natures of the Constitution.53 The notion that the arrangement 
of state organization including primary constitutional organs constitutes the 
Constitution’s substance is also proposed by William G. Andrews. He suggests 
that constitution’s substance is intended to regulate three important things, as 
follows: (a) to limit the authority of constitutional state organs, (b) to regulate 
the relationship among constitutional state organs, and (c) to regulate the power 
relation between constitutional state organs and citizens.54
The 1945 Constitution as the Indonesian constitution actually contains the 
arrangement of constitutional structure and state organization. AB Kusuma states 
the 1945 Constitution meets the qualification to be a constitution which includes 
some substances as follows: (a) preamble; (b) governance structure determining 
the function, duty, and authority of each constitutional organ; (c) citizens’ rights 
and obligations according to Human Rights; (d) guarantee the constitutionality 
of law through judicial review which is the authority of Constitutional Courts; 
and € norms to amend the constitution.55 However, it must be admitted that the 
1945 Constitution does not fully regulate the state organization, e.g. it does not 
regulate the leadership tenure of primary constitutional organs such as MPR, 
DPR, DPD, MA, MK, and BPK.
Furthermore, the second model is the tenure arrangement of constitutional 
organ leaders through law. Although it is not as strong as provided by the 
Constitution, it is still acceptable. According to Hans Kelsen’s opinion, the 
constitution material consists of regulations governing the creation of legal 
norms in general, especially law:
The material constitution may determine not only the organs and the procedure 
of legislation, but also, to some degree, the content of future laws. The 
53  Mirriam Budiardjo, Dasar-Dasar Ilmu Politik, Jakarta: Gramedia, 1989, p. 101.
54  Jimly Asshiddiqie, “Islam dan Tradisi Negara Konstitutional”, a paper presented at Seminar on Indonesia-Malaysia, UIN/IAIN Padang, 
Padang, 7 October 2010, p. 4.
55  Dewa Gede Atmadja, Hukum Konstitusi, Problematika Konstitusi Indonesia Sesudah Perubahan UUD 1945, Malang, Setara Press, 
2010, p. 80.
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constitution can negatively determine that the law must not have a certain 
content, e.g. that the parliament may not pass any statute which restrict 
religious freedom. In this negative way, not only the content of statutes but 
of all the other norms of the legal order, judicial and administrative decisions 
likewise, may be determined by the constitution. The constitution, however, 
can also positively prescribe a certain content of future statutes; it can, as 
does for instance the constitution of the United States of America, stipulate 
“that in all criminal prosecution the accused shall enjoy the right to a speedy 
and public trial, by an impartial jury of the state and district where in the 
crime shall have been committed which district shall have been previously 
ascertained by law, etc.” This provision of the constitution determines the 
content of future laws concerning criminal procedure. 56
To further regulate the incomplete arrangement of constitutional organs 
that exist in the Constitution is conducted by Law because constitution has 
a special nature or characteristic, i.e. its substance only regulates or contains 
subject matter so its norm level is at legal principle level which belongs to meta-
norm. Thus, it requires further regulation, i.e. Law, which is at legal norm level 
(legal norm regulates certain behavior).57 The Constitution is a basic principle 
or state principle containing goals to be achieved. The Constitution is expected 
to have an indefinite range of validity. To enable the achievement of these goals, 
the Constitution is commonly formulated to allow a great adaptability with the 
occurred changes.58
The fact that the 1945 Constitution only includes presidential tenure and 
excludes other constitutional organ leadership tenure shows that the framers want 
to make it brief and flexible.59 It is based on the mindset that the Constitution 
is enough to contain only the basic rules and the outline as an instruction to the 
central government and other state apparatus to organize the state. Meanwhile, 
the implementation of basic principles is given to the other legislation.60
According to Moh. Kusnadi and Bintan R. Saragih, as a written constitution 
the 1945 constitution tends to be short. Its short nature is intended to simply 
arrange the outline or the main issue while the other problems can be arranged 
56  Hans Kelsen, op. cit., p. 157.
57  Dewa Gede Atmadja, Hukum Konstitusi, op. cit., p. 40.
58  Bagir Manan, Pertumbuhan  dan Perkembangan Konstitusi Suatu Negara, Bandung: Mandar Maju, 1995, p. 7.
59  Dahlan Thaib, et. al., Teori Hukum dan Konstitusi, Jakarta: RajaGrafindo Persada,1999, p. 140.
60  Ibid.
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by Law.61 Some provisions in the 1945 Constitution require further regulation 
through the Law although its implementation is not explained in the article of 
the Constitution in order to run the provision well.62
Regarding the third regulation model that is not arranged by the Law 
but it is arranged in the internal regulation, and the fourth model that is not 
arranged by the law as well as internal regulation are models with the low level 
of legal certainty. It happens for several reasons, first, the internal regulation 
such as MPR regulation, DPR regulation, and DPD regulation does not fulfill 
the qualification as legislation. 
According to Bagir Manan, legislation is any written decision issued by an 
authorized official which contains rules or behaviors in general.63 In addition, A. 
Hamid S. Attamimi explains legislation is all laws created by constitutional organs 
in a certain form complemented by sanctions. It enforces and binds people.64
T J Buys interprets that legislation binds generally, whereas JHA. Logemann 
added with the formulation “naar buiten werkende voorschriften”, so it becomes 
“bindende algemeen en naar buiten werkende voorschriften” (generally binding 
regulation and enacted out).65 Article 1 (1) and (2) of the Law No. 12/2011 also 
defines legislation as a written regulation containing legal norm which binds 
generally and created or established by constitutional organs or authorized 
officials through the specified procedure in legislation
MPR’s code of conduct, DPR’s code of conduct, and DPD’s code of conduct 
is fulfilled the written legislation elements containing legal norms and created or 
established by constitutional organs or authorized officials through the specified 
procedure in legislation, but it cannot be classified as legislation because it only 
binds MPR members, DPR members, or DPD members and does not bind all 
people. The other things showing that MPR’s code of conduct, DPR’s code of 
61  Moh. Kusnardi and Bintan R Saragih, Susunan Pembagian Kekuasaan Menurut Undang-Undang Dasar 1945, Jakarta: Gramedia, 
1994, p. 35.
62  Ibid, p. 39.
63  Bagir Manan, Dasar-Dasar Perundang-undangan Indonesia, Jakarta: In-Hill-Co, 1992, p. 3.
64  A. Hamid S. Attamimi, Peranan Keputusan Presiden RI dalam Penyelenggaraan Pemerintahan Negara, Disertasi, Jakarta: Fakultas 
Pascasarjana Universitas Indonesia, 1990, p. 200.
65  Amirudin Syarif. Perundang-undangan, Dasar, Jenis, dan Teknik Membuatnya, Jakarta: Bina Aksara, 1987, p. 32-33.
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conduct, and DPD’s code of conduct are not a legislation is they are not enacted 
in state gazette or official gazette, whereas Article 81 of the Law No. 12/2011 
requires all people should be informed, the Legislation should be enacted.
Second, the exclusion of constitutional organ leadership tenure such as 
MPR, DPR and DPD in Law but only regulated in constitutional organs’ internal 
regulations are vulnerable to create a turmoil and commotion in case the 
constitutional organ leader fails to perform his authorities and duties, fails to 
manage and maintain the trust of the members. Considering that it is enough 
to change the internal regulation by fulfilling the members minimal quorum 
(fifty present plus one vote of all the members), it is exactly what is happening 
to DPD.
For example is the DPR Regulation no. 1/2014 on DPR’s code of conduct which 
can be amended at any time as long as the DPR members desire it. Article 322 
(1) of the DPR Regulation no. 1/2014 on the Proposal of DPR’s Code of Conduct 
Amendment can be proposed by at least 5 (five) parliament factions. Article 
323 (1) regulates the amendment proposal referred to Article 322 (1) shall be 
proposed by the DPR leader in the DPR plenary session. Furthermore, Article 
323 (3) regulates in the event the amendment proposal is approved, DPR plenary 
session submits it to the Legislature to be discussed. According to Article 323(5) 
regulates the result of the discussion referred to paragraph (3) shall be reported 
to the DPR plenary session for making a decision.
The same regulation also applies to the DPD Regulation No. 1/2014 on DPD’s 
Code of Conduct which can be amended at any time as long as the majority of 
the members desire it. Article 243 of the DPD Regulation no. 1/2014 regulates the 
proposal of DPD’s code of conduct amendment may be proposed to the plenary 
session through the Deliberation Committee by: (a) Ethics Council; (b) at least 
two Board Fittings; or (c) at least 30% members (thirty-five per one hundred) 
which reflects the representation of ten provinces and spread over three regions 
proportionally. Article 244(2) regulates in the event the amendment proposal 
is approved, the plenary session establishes a Special Committee to make the 
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improvements. Article 244 (4) regulates the results of the discussion referred to 
paragraph (2) shall be submitted to the plenary session for making a decision.
III. CONCLUSION
The regulations about the tenure of constitutional organs leader required at 
least based on two considerations. The first consideration is, as the implementation 
of the principle of power limitation; and secondly, as a manifestation of the 
political equality principle among the citizens as the characteristic of a democratic 
state. From the hierarchy aspect if it is viewed in terms of the primary position 
and function, the constitutional organs which can be said as the principal or 
major after the 1945 amendments are (i) the President; (Ii) DPR (Representatives 
Council); (Iii) DPD (Regional Representatives Council); (Iv) MPR (People’s 
Consultative Assembly); (V) MK (Constitutional Court); (Vi) MA (Supreme 
Court); and (vii) BPK (Supreme Audit Agency).
Regarding the regulation of constitutional organs tenure which qualified 
as primary constitutional organs if it is seen from the type of legislation which 
regulates it, evidently does not have the uniformity because it has four variants/
models: First Model, tenure regulation through a constitution namely 1945 
constitution, belong to this category is the President and Vice President tenure. 
Second Model, state institutions tenure regulation through Law. Belong to this 
second category is Supreme Court (MA) and Constitutional Court (MK). Third 
Model, tenure regulations which are not regulated by law, but regulated in the 
internal regulations (code of conduct regulation), MPR, DPR, DPD include in 
this category. Fourth Model, tenure regulations which are not arranged in Law 
nor internal regulations. For instance, Supreme Audit Agency (BPK).
From the four models constitutional organs tenure regulations which 
regulated by the 1945 Constitution, regulated by the Law, are not regulated by 
the Law but regulated in the internal regulations of the primary constitutional 
organs, and are not regulated by Law nor by primary constitutional organs 
internal regulations, each of them has the degree of power related to the legal 
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guarantee. Model of primary constitutional organs tenure regulations in the 1945 
Constitution is the most powerful model ensuring the legal guarantee because 
of some reasons which are the 1945 Constitution is the state constitution which 
placed in the highest order of national legal order and the arrangement of primary 
constitutional organs tenure regulations which is strongly associated with the 
structure and organization of primary constitutional organs is the substance of 
the 1945 Constitution. Next, the second model that is through the Law although 
it is not as strong as provided by the 1945 Constitution, but if this option is 
done then it still acceptable. Considering to organize incomplete constitutional 
organs regulation in the 1945 Constitution can be done by the Law because the 
constitution has its traits or characteristics namely the substance which only 
arrange or contains subject matter. 
Concerning about the third model that is not regulated by the Law but is 
regulated in the internal regulations, and the fourth model that is not regulated 
by the Law nor in the internal regulations are the models which have a lower 
rank of legal guarantee. This is because the internal regulations, such as MPR, 
DPR, and DPD regulations, do not qualify as legislation. Furthermore, the 
exclusion of primary constitutional organs tenure regulations such as MPR, 
DPR and DPD in the Law only regulated in the internal regulations of primary 
constitutional organs are vulnerable create a turmoil and commotion because 
it is easy to change the internal regulation by only have to fulfill the members 
minimal quorum (over one from the half of total members) can change the 
tenure of the leader anytime.
To prevent the conflicts among the member of primary constitutional organs 
and prevent an unnecessary turmoil which can interfere the authority exercise of 
the primary constitutional organs, we need to conduct a change to the primary 
constitutional organs tenure regulations so that it is not regulated by the primary 
constitutional organs internal regulations, but it should be regulated in the 1945 
Constitution or at least in the Law (UU) in order to better ensuring the legal 
guarantee.
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